This is more or less a direct copy from my actual word-document that I wrote. Please don't expect massive amounts of information (I had a word limit of 4000 
) or a lot of coding and nice layouts.
The Yakuza, sometimes called bōryokudan, which translates as ‘violent group(s)’, and who refer to themselves as ninkyō dantai, which translates as ‘honourable organization’, have been around for a long time. Although the exact origins of the Yakuza remain shrouded in mystery, most scholars that engage in the research on these groups have concluded that they (the Yakuza) have been around since the early history of Japan, albeit under different names and performing different (illegal) professions.
For example, some have argued that the Yakuza originated from the bakuto, the illegal gamblers, and the tekiya, the street peddlers. (Kaplan, 2012) The theory that the Yakuza originate from the bakuto is given more merit by the meaning of the individual words that make up Yakuza – Ya (eight) Ku (nine) Za (three). These cards together made up the ‘worst hand’ you could be dealt in the Japanese card game that was popular at the time of the bakuto.
The meaning of this is unclear, even to modern-day yakuza, and it is theorized that this means that the Yakuza see their lives as delinquent to be ‘the worst hand’ they could get dealt. After all, honour and respect are still ever present in Japanese society, and a life of crime and delinquency is hardly honourable or respect worthy. As such it is possible that the Yakuza are self-aware of their bad lifestyle. Another theory is that the Yakuza named themselves after this ‘bad hand’ to spell out what would happen to those that opposed them – they would be dealt a bad hand.
Ultimately, the Japanese Yakuza are subject to a lot of glamorization in popular media. There are many forms of media that have used them. These forms of media even date back to the Edo-era of Japan, where plays were performed featuring rogues and characters that were the Japanese equivalent of ‘Robin Hood,’ which many Yakuza claim to be ‘their own.’ Furthermore, modern-day movies have also featured them. For example, they were featured in a western movie like Kill Bill, and popularized and glamorized in there. Another example would be the Japanese movies ‘Crows Zero’ where in the protagonist is the son of a Yakuza gang, but is also helped by a captain of a rival Yakuza gang. In this movie the few Yakuza we see are portrayed in a way that Japan likes to see them – hardened criminals who live a luxurious life over the backs of others.
In each of these movies it is very clear that there are conflicting ideas about the Yakuza when it comes to the real world and the world that media has popularized. Although Kill Bill would have you believe that the Yakuza are some form of ancient warrior criminal group who use swords, this is quite far from the truth. And in comparison to Japanese media, the Yakuza are more often than not simple business men.
Not all popular ideas about Yakuza are false, however. They are world-famous for their body covering tattoo’s, and the stories about fingers being cut off for minor transgressions are certainly true. However, what we often forget is the meaning behind these actions. For example, the tattoos are not purely aesthetical. They hold meaning, and often a tattoo artist would spend hours trying to figure out a Yakuza members personality in order to find out what tattoo would fit him best.
As far as the cutting off of fingers (usually the pinkie) goes, this action also had a meaningful purpose. It’s an old tradition when a Yakuza member breaks the rules of the Yakuza that a section of the finger is cut off. This act of punishment and/or apology is called yubitsume, which translates as finger shortening. This was done to make it harder for this Yakuza member to wield a sword or knife, and has continued into modern times as pistols and other weaponry are hard to come by in Japan (and much of Asia). (Kaplan, 2012) Never the less, popular ideas about the Yakuza fail to account for these, most likely due to the distance we have to this group of criminals. Therefore, it is a highly interesting group to research, especially considering that they are so different from other criminal organizations and will require a unique policy implementation to combat them.
Although the Yakuza is very much an outlier in terms of criminality when it comes to organizations, there are certainly traits in the Yakuza that can be found in most other criminal organizations.
As a starting grounds, it is wise to look at the make-up of these groups. Who specifically joins criminal organizations as a full member? Most often you will find that these are the poor of society – people with little money and status – and this holds true for most criminal organizations. There are numerous explanations for this trend. For example, if we follow the teachings of the anomie/strain theories, it would be fairly easy to explain why specifically these people utilise criminal organizations. The poor of society would feel like they cannot obtain their goals (status, money, material wealth) through financial means, which holds true for most societies and the respective criminal organizations operating within these societies. After all, is a criminal organization not the epitome of illegal criminal activities in a near-corporate form? (Agnew, 1992)
Another way to possibly explain this behaviour is through rational choice theory, although this is slightly harder. In his book ‘The Reasoning Criminal’ Derek B. Cornish highlights a flowchart in which he describes the influencing factors for an actors’ rational choices – these include for example ‘generalized needs’ and ‘solutions evaluated.’ Following this chart there are numerous factors that are also present in the organized criminal world – money, sex, friendship, status and excitement in the generalized needs department, the likelihood of getting caught in the solutions evaluated department. So, for one actor, it might be decidedly better to join a criminal organization. (Derek B. Cornish, 2014)
However, this does not explain why poor people would be more likely to join criminal organizations. To answer this, one has to look at the relative gains for a poor person as opposed to those of a wealthier individual. A poor person would have a much easier time in organized crime, as opposed to operating on his own. First of all, social needs would be fulfilled within the organization, as opposed to a person of average or above average income. One can assume that these people would already have social ties at work and at home, where as for poor people this is statistically less likely. Furthermore, the risks for a poor individual would be much less high in an organization and the gains would be much higher than if he were to act on his own. This would explain why poor people make up the bulk of criminal organizations as ‘soldiers’ or ‘grunts’ that do the main work of the groups. This is the case for the Yakuza as well as other organizations.
Another similarity is the structural make-up of the organization. This structure is very similar to the Italian mafia, who use a very structural hierarchy with a clear leader, underbosses, captains and soldiers. This is no different for the Yakuza, who utilize a system that is very similar. As can be seen in figure one, the structure is quite simple, and utilises different positions for various jobs, such as legal advisors and soldiers.
When compared to figure 2, which highlights the Italian mafia hierarchy, it becomes quite clear that the Yakuza operates in a similar fashion to the mafia. There is a similar structure, with legal advisors (consiglieri, shingiin) and underbosses (underboss, wakagashira/shateigashira) as well as a similar division of ‘workforce’ in the forms of a capo and his soldiers, and the kyodai and their shatei.
By comparing these organizations, it becomes quite clear why the Yakuza are considered to be an organization as opposed to a gang – they are very organized, have a clear leadership, a hierarchy, and in almost every way operate like other criminal organizations.
Although the Yakuza are very similar to other criminal organizations, there are still large differences. The Yakuza finds their roots in similar situations and contexts as other organizations. They were originally made to protect the people in their neighbourhood/group. Much like the mafia was made to act as a local vigilante law-bringing organization, the yakuza has acted much in the same way. This is why they still refer to themselves as ninkyō dantai (honourable organization). However unlike other criminal organizations, they have partially stayed true to these roots and in fact do perform deeds that could generally be considered ‘good.’
For example, during the 2012 Japan earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown of the Fukushima plant, they were heavily involved in rescue operations and delivered food and supplies to the zones affected by the tsunami. Although their motives were questioned, as some considered this to be a public relations stunt by the Yakuza, it was generally seen as a good thing that the Yakuza intervened to offer help. In fact, they arrived before officials did. Although it was likely that they in part utilised this as a situation to earn good-will from the civilians, it cannot be denied that this act in and of itself was a good act. (Adelstein, Yakuza to the Rescue, 2011)
Furthermore, another key difference is the ability to identify the members of the Yakuza. While other people involved in criminal organizations wish to hide their affiliation with these groups, in the Yakuza this is quite different. Although you will be hard pressed to find anyone that openly identifies as a Yakuza member, it is generally considered common knowledge who is in charge of what Yakuza clan. Furthermore, the presence of tattoo’s is quite scarce in Japan and most people consider tattoo’s to be marks of delinquency. As such, bearing a tattoo could be an indicator of affiliation with the Yakuza, especially if they are done in the specific Yakuza style. (Japan Daily Press, 2012)
Another difference is the ‘legal’ aspect of the Yakuza. Much like other criminal organizations it is undoubtedly true that there are large amounts of money and power involved in the day-to-day business of the organization, but unlike the other criminal organizations this power is very visible and manifests very clearly in everyday life for Japan. This holds especially true for the corporate and political world of Japan. (Fisher, 2012) One might think that the very essence of being a criminal organization ensures that nobody – corporate or politically affiliated – would cooperate with them, but the opposite has held true in many cases. In fact, contrary to popular belief, the government actually acknowledges them and regulates (some) them. In turn this legalizes the Yakuza, and in fact, being a part of a Yakuza group is not always illegal in Japan.
This has happened in return for the financial and physical favours they have done for the political elite. Although one could describe this as corruption, the shape it takes resembles something more closely related to the acknowledgement of the good within the bad. The reason for my saying this is that there have been a lot of crackdowns on the criminal elements of the Yakuza both from the police and their leadership as well as the political elite despite the fact that they have received favours in the past. (Fisher, 2012) Until 1992 however, the Yakuza enjoyed a more or less free playing field for them to muddle around in, and it wasn’t until 1992 that the political elite begun fighting back. And even then, it is hard to say that the political elite has actually reached any goals. In fact, the crackdowns that have thus far occurred forced the Yakuza to reorganize into more efficient leadership methods as well as financial schemes, which in turn has made them more profitable. (Kaplan, 2012)
Thus far, the Yakuza has had a lot of influence in the political world of Japan. It seems that the current outlook is that this is unlikely to change soon, due to heavily ingrained influence, large amounts of legal assets (financial, influence on people, capability to muster support for a cause) as well as the ability to utilize assets/influence for the public good (for example the 2012 disaster relief). These factors all have caused the Yakuza to become heavily involved not only in the countries politics but also their economy.
Due to their political involvement with the ‘Liberal Democratic Party’ of Japan, many Yakuza clans are directly involved with numerous political characters, and have been involved with the allocation of official government titles to people from this party. (Independent, 1993) This influence is to be blamed for most of the lenient policies that the Yakuza have faced in the past. For example, it is not illegal to be part of a Yakuza clan in Japan, and for a long time it was also legal to do business with Yakuza clans, despite their criminal nature. This has changed now, but for the longest time the Yakuza had more or less obtained a free reign when it came to their power.
Through their massive influence over the Japanese political situation, they have been able to ensure that, for instance, they would not get wiretapped and would not be interfered with in their money-making schemes. (Fisher, 2012)
Another implication thus far has been the acceptance of the National Police Agency (NPA) that they would be unable to get rid of criminal elements and activities within society altogether. This context is perhaps best comparable to the Dutch acknowledgement of drugs as an illegal substance and the Dutch governmental choice on how to deal with users – the acceptance of the inability to deal with users, and instead opting for a campaign of regulation and education on the effects of drugs. For the Yakuza, this approach has meant that thus far the police have maintained a policy of acceptance. For example, the gambling and prostitution industry have thus far historically been the area of operations for the Yakuza. Both gambling and prostitution are illegal in Japan, but it seems unlikely that the Japanese police would be able to deal with the problem. Therefore, they have opted to let the Yakuza conduct their operations ‘’out of sight’’ to ensure that the gambling and prostitution dens would at least be controlled by a figure of authority who they could count on to keep the peace. (Independent, 1993)
To add onto this, Japan has always had a very heavy anti-drug stance and will most likely continue to hold on to these values. Never the less, the NPA or perhaps more obviously, the police officers of Japan, have always more or less accepted the drug trade the Yakuza were involved in. This came from the mutual understanding that while the drugs the Yakuza dealt in (soft drugs) were harmful, harder drug types would be even more harmful, both to the people that took them and the general public, and the Yakuza would therefore ensure these were kept off the streets – and hopefully out of Japan altogether. From this is visible that, once again, while the Yakuza engage in criminal activities, they consider themselves to be an ‘honourable organization’ and they try to uphold themselves to that standard.
As the Yakuza are notoriously right wing, it is also probable that they have helped in shaping laws and regulations of the country. Although Japan is seen as a liberal left wing country in modern times (depending on what part of their policy/law-making you are looking at), this wasn’t always the case. Following the Yakuza and their influence on the Liberal Democratic Party, Japan underwent heavy right wing decision-making that shaped the laws of Japan, and as it is not improbable to estimate that current immigration policies as well as other policies are a result of this influence.
Due to the pre-existing power of the Yakuza groups, both economically as they have managed to white-wash their money through legal enterprises being constructed, as well as politically through the earning of favours from high-ranking government officials, it will be very hard to properly ‘combat’ the Yakuza. And in addition to their established power, the police also acknowledge that if they were to fully get rid of the Yakuza, these groups would be replaced with less organized and ‘chivalrous’ groups which would lead to even more apparent criminality and problem. (Fisher, 2012, Kaplan, 2012)
Although there are some critics of the approach, reintegrative shaming plays a large part in dealing with criminality in Japan – in fact, in some studies it is attributed as the number 1 approach for Japanese approaches to crime. This is especially interesting, considering that Japan has one of the lowest crime rates in the world. (Kersten, 1993)
But for the Yakuza this lays differently. They are easily spotted, as compared to ‘regular’ criminals. Due to Japan’s attitude to, for instance, tatttoo’s, it would be very hard to reintegrate these people. After all, whe you get banned from spa’s due to having tattoo’s, how could one expect to get a legal job when you have tattoo’s? (Japan Daily Press, 2012) Furthermore, we should also consider that there is a ‘price’ to be paid for leaving a Yakuza group. If someone wishes to leave the group and cease associating with them, the Yakuza will most likely demand a price to be paid in the form of a finger being lost, or depending on the offenses, death. So when we approach the Yakuza problem with the approach of reintegrating them, it seems that this will be close to impossible.
Another problem with the reintegrative shaming approach is that in Japanese culture, the Yakuza are seen as ‘a fact of life’ (Fisher, 2012) and it is believed that they serve a purpose in Japanese society. This represents something akin to ‘providing balance in the evil’ or ‘organized criminality’ that prevents criminals from growing too chaotic, evil and twisted. Although it would be hard to prove this is the case, the culture seems to imply that it is. As a result, reintegrative shaming will most likely not have a large effect, since the Yakuza believe that their position is one of necessary evil.
Another potential problem with policy implementations to combat the Yakuza is the fact that Yakuza are theoretically not an illegal organization in and of itself. Although the police would argue otherwise, it is not precisely clear whether or not Yakuza activities are attributed to the Yakuza group itself or the individuals conducting them (in name of the group). Therefore, is it possible that the reintegrative shaming method that is proclaimed to be ‘highly effective’ due to low crime rates really as effective, if the lack of documentation of illegal activities conducted by the Yakuza groups means that the low crime-rate is artificial? After all, if we documented the activities conducted by the groups properly, wouldn’t the crime-rate rise higher?
So if the primary solution applied to criminals proves to be ineffective to the Yakuza, what would work? The answer is complex and is almost certainly the case that there is no universal answer. After all, the Yakuza groups are very different and all of them seem to have their own organizational personality. (Kaplan, 2012) Where as some organizations are ultra-violent and involved in violent crimes, other Yakuza organizations have since the re-organizations shifted their activities almost entirely to the legal side of the spectrum, only engaging in ‘grey area’ crimes from time to time. So almost naturally, the approach to this type of powerful economical Yakuza group would differ strongly from the ultra-violent Yakuza groups.
And even if there were actions to be taken, would this be the right move? Although combatting their highly illegal and harmful activities (violence, drug trade, human trafficking) is most certainly a requirement, nationally by the National Police Association, and internationally by the international community at large, it would be naïve to assume that there are no benefits to the Japanese government as well as the Japanese society as a whole that come from these Yakuza organizations. Who else will provide a measure of organization and order in otherwise chaotic businesses like prostitution and drug trade? Would these issues not grow even larger with the absence of Yakuza groups? The NPA seems to think so, and history agrees as well.
As evidence has shown us, the Yakuza largely legalized their operations during the period after world war 2 – when Japan was going through a large scale industrialization and economics were looking up. Perhaps one solution would be to ensure economic viability in Japan – lately their economy has stagnated and while they are not going through a recession in the same capacity as the western world, their economy isn’t growing at a large rate either. In order to facilitate the legalization of their activities, one idea would be to ensure a prosperous economy. This is naturally within the interest of the entire country, however, and therefore it would be hard to sell this as an ‘anti-Yakuza policy.’
Measures that can be taken to combat Yakuza activity in general is, first of all, to actually make Yakuza organizations illegal. As of yet, most Yakuza members are not considered to be criminals purely by association (although, it is in fact illegal to deal with and facilitate illegal operations conducted by Yakuza groups) and in fact, they openly use the name of their respective Yakuza group to gain (negative) respect in the form of fear. (Fisher, 2012) If Japan were to make Yakuza groups as a whole into an illegal organization, these organizations will be forced to change their modus operandi, and will be forced to either adapt a new identity (through which the Japanese government/police could force them to conduct legal operations) or otherwise force them to adopt a construction similar to the Italian mafia. This would mean that they would no longer be able to use their identity as a Yakuza group to force people to do their will – and thus would harm their business initially while they adapt. During this period it would be possible to arrest and trial these members.
There is a glaring problem with this policy, and any other policy that could be created. The Yakuza’s large influence on the politics of the country and their financial capabilities (that open up a world of lobbying that is unpresedented in other criminal organizations) mean that they are more than likely completely capable of blocking any type of policy that would severely harm their livelihood.
But perhaps the most interesting policy solution would be to cooperate with the Yakuza groups – although they clearly engage in illegal operations, it is also not the case that they never perform worthwhile deeds. Although they are a criminal organization in essence, it might be worthwhile to cooperate with them and enforce positive deeds while limiting negative deeds. For instance, a possible method of cooperation (not unlike western methods) would be the legalization of prostitution and soft drugs. The chances of this ever happening are slim due to Japanese culture, but if we disregard that, this has the promise of a worthwhile policy implementation.
One prerequisite of this policy however would be the inclusion of influential Yakuza groups in the discussion to shape this policy. After all, it would not create a positive environment if the Japanese government would disregard the already existing drug and prostitution systems, and would disregard the parties involved in these systems. Simply a legalization of the existing systems with regulations and official bodies would most likely help combat the illegal activities of the groups while also enforcing positive regulations and laws to ensure that working conditions are better than they were before, and above all, that they are safer. This would help ensure safety for all parties involved, limit criminality (because the acts are no longer criminal, as well as being able to regulate those that work outside of the legal system better and deal with them) and appease the Yakuza groups in a way that doesn’t force them to use their power negatively.
All-in-all however, it appears as if there is no solvable solution to the Yakuza-problem. Their power has been allowed to grow too strong and any policy implementation that is direct will likely be countered more or less directly by their influence and economical power to lobby. Perhaps the best solution is to simply accept their presence as the Japanese government has done so far, and only interfere when the public safety or lives of civilians are endangered or at stake. So far this has seemed to work somewhat, although it is a problem that this policy would allow the Yakuza’s power to grow even larger.
Bibliography
Adelstein, J. (2011, April 9). Retrieved from Independent: independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/mobs..
Adelstein, J. (2011, March 18). Yakuza to the Rescue. Retrieved from nicoletakeda: nicoletakeda.com/uploads/4/2/8/5/42853..
Agnew, R. (1992). FOUNDATION FOR A GENERAL STRAIN THEORY OF CRIME AND DELINQUENCY. Atlanta: Emory University.
Derek B. Cornish, R. V. (2014). The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice Perspectives on Offending. Transaction Publishers.
Fisher, E. (2012). From Outcasts to Overlords: The Legitimation of the Yakuza in Japanese Society. Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press.
Independent. (1993, January 17). Japan's Crime Incorporated: The years of the bubble economy lured Japan's yakuza gangs to muscle into big business. Terry McCarthy in Tokyo explores their corporate web. Retrieved from Independent: independent.co.uk/news/business/japans..
Japan Daily Press. (2012, June 29). The view of tattoos in Japanese society. Retrieved from Japan Daily Press: japandailypress.com/the-view-of-tattoo..
Kaplan, D. E. (2012). Yakuza: Japan's Criminal Underworld. California: University of California Press.
Kersten, J. (1993). Street Youths, Bosozoku, and Yakuza: Subculture Formation and Societal Reactions in Japan . SAGE Social Science Collections.
) or a lot of coding and nice layouts. Introductory chapter
The Yakuza, sometimes called bōryokudan, which translates as ‘violent group(s)’, and who refer to themselves as ninkyō dantai, which translates as ‘honourable organization’, have been around for a long time. Although the exact origins of the Yakuza remain shrouded in mystery, most scholars that engage in the research on these groups have concluded that they (the Yakuza) have been around since the early history of Japan, albeit under different names and performing different (illegal) professions.
For example, some have argued that the Yakuza originated from the bakuto, the illegal gamblers, and the tekiya, the street peddlers. (Kaplan, 2012) The theory that the Yakuza originate from the bakuto is given more merit by the meaning of the individual words that make up Yakuza – Ya (eight) Ku (nine) Za (three). These cards together made up the ‘worst hand’ you could be dealt in the Japanese card game that was popular at the time of the bakuto.
The meaning of this is unclear, even to modern-day yakuza, and it is theorized that this means that the Yakuza see their lives as delinquent to be ‘the worst hand’ they could get dealt. After all, honour and respect are still ever present in Japanese society, and a life of crime and delinquency is hardly honourable or respect worthy. As such it is possible that the Yakuza are self-aware of their bad lifestyle. Another theory is that the Yakuza named themselves after this ‘bad hand’ to spell out what would happen to those that opposed them – they would be dealt a bad hand.
Ultimately, the Japanese Yakuza are subject to a lot of glamorization in popular media. There are many forms of media that have used them. These forms of media even date back to the Edo-era of Japan, where plays were performed featuring rogues and characters that were the Japanese equivalent of ‘Robin Hood,’ which many Yakuza claim to be ‘their own.’ Furthermore, modern-day movies have also featured them. For example, they were featured in a western movie like Kill Bill, and popularized and glamorized in there. Another example would be the Japanese movies ‘Crows Zero’ where in the protagonist is the son of a Yakuza gang, but is also helped by a captain of a rival Yakuza gang. In this movie the few Yakuza we see are portrayed in a way that Japan likes to see them – hardened criminals who live a luxurious life over the backs of others.
In each of these movies it is very clear that there are conflicting ideas about the Yakuza when it comes to the real world and the world that media has popularized. Although Kill Bill would have you believe that the Yakuza are some form of ancient warrior criminal group who use swords, this is quite far from the truth. And in comparison to Japanese media, the Yakuza are more often than not simple business men.
Not all popular ideas about Yakuza are false, however. They are world-famous for their body covering tattoo’s, and the stories about fingers being cut off for minor transgressions are certainly true. However, what we often forget is the meaning behind these actions. For example, the tattoos are not purely aesthetical. They hold meaning, and often a tattoo artist would spend hours trying to figure out a Yakuza members personality in order to find out what tattoo would fit him best.
As far as the cutting off of fingers (usually the pinkie) goes, this action also had a meaningful purpose. It’s an old tradition when a Yakuza member breaks the rules of the Yakuza that a section of the finger is cut off. This act of punishment and/or apology is called yubitsume, which translates as finger shortening. This was done to make it harder for this Yakuza member to wield a sword or knife, and has continued into modern times as pistols and other weaponry are hard to come by in Japan (and much of Asia). (Kaplan, 2012) Never the less, popular ideas about the Yakuza fail to account for these, most likely due to the distance we have to this group of criminals. Therefore, it is a highly interesting group to research, especially considering that they are so different from other criminal organizations and will require a unique policy implementation to combat them.
Comparison to other organizations
Although the Yakuza is very much an outlier in terms of criminality when it comes to organizations, there are certainly traits in the Yakuza that can be found in most other criminal organizations.
As a starting grounds, it is wise to look at the make-up of these groups. Who specifically joins criminal organizations as a full member? Most often you will find that these are the poor of society – people with little money and status – and this holds true for most criminal organizations. There are numerous explanations for this trend. For example, if we follow the teachings of the anomie/strain theories, it would be fairly easy to explain why specifically these people utilise criminal organizations. The poor of society would feel like they cannot obtain their goals (status, money, material wealth) through financial means, which holds true for most societies and the respective criminal organizations operating within these societies. After all, is a criminal organization not the epitome of illegal criminal activities in a near-corporate form? (Agnew, 1992)
Another way to possibly explain this behaviour is through rational choice theory, although this is slightly harder. In his book ‘The Reasoning Criminal’ Derek B. Cornish highlights a flowchart in which he describes the influencing factors for an actors’ rational choices – these include for example ‘generalized needs’ and ‘solutions evaluated.’ Following this chart there are numerous factors that are also present in the organized criminal world – money, sex, friendship, status and excitement in the generalized needs department, the likelihood of getting caught in the solutions evaluated department. So, for one actor, it might be decidedly better to join a criminal organization. (Derek B. Cornish, 2014)
However, this does not explain why poor people would be more likely to join criminal organizations. To answer this, one has to look at the relative gains for a poor person as opposed to those of a wealthier individual. A poor person would have a much easier time in organized crime, as opposed to operating on his own. First of all, social needs would be fulfilled within the organization, as opposed to a person of average or above average income. One can assume that these people would already have social ties at work and at home, where as for poor people this is statistically less likely. Furthermore, the risks for a poor individual would be much less high in an organization and the gains would be much higher than if he were to act on his own. This would explain why poor people make up the bulk of criminal organizations as ‘soldiers’ or ‘grunts’ that do the main work of the groups. This is the case for the Yakuza as well as other organizations.
Another similarity is the structural make-up of the organization. This structure is very similar to the Italian mafia, who use a very structural hierarchy with a clear leader, underbosses, captains and soldiers. This is no different for the Yakuza, who utilize a system that is very similar. As can be seen in figure one, the structure is quite simple, and utilises different positions for various jobs, such as legal advisors and soldiers.
When compared to figure 2, which highlights the Italian mafia hierarchy, it becomes quite clear that the Yakuza operates in a similar fashion to the mafia. There is a similar structure, with legal advisors (consiglieri, shingiin) and underbosses (underboss, wakagashira/shateigashira) as well as a similar division of ‘workforce’ in the forms of a capo and his soldiers, and the kyodai and their shatei.
By comparing these organizations, it becomes quite clear why the Yakuza are considered to be an organization as opposed to a gang – they are very organized, have a clear leadership, a hierarchy, and in almost every way operate like other criminal organizations.
Differences between the Yakuza and other criminal organizations
Although the Yakuza are very similar to other criminal organizations, there are still large differences. The Yakuza finds their roots in similar situations and contexts as other organizations. They were originally made to protect the people in their neighbourhood/group. Much like the mafia was made to act as a local vigilante law-bringing organization, the yakuza has acted much in the same way. This is why they still refer to themselves as ninkyō dantai (honourable organization). However unlike other criminal organizations, they have partially stayed true to these roots and in fact do perform deeds that could generally be considered ‘good.’
For example, during the 2012 Japan earthquake, tsunami and nuclear meltdown of the Fukushima plant, they were heavily involved in rescue operations and delivered food and supplies to the zones affected by the tsunami. Although their motives were questioned, as some considered this to be a public relations stunt by the Yakuza, it was generally seen as a good thing that the Yakuza intervened to offer help. In fact, they arrived before officials did. Although it was likely that they in part utilised this as a situation to earn good-will from the civilians, it cannot be denied that this act in and of itself was a good act. (Adelstein, Yakuza to the Rescue, 2011)
Furthermore, another key difference is the ability to identify the members of the Yakuza. While other people involved in criminal organizations wish to hide their affiliation with these groups, in the Yakuza this is quite different. Although you will be hard pressed to find anyone that openly identifies as a Yakuza member, it is generally considered common knowledge who is in charge of what Yakuza clan. Furthermore, the presence of tattoo’s is quite scarce in Japan and most people consider tattoo’s to be marks of delinquency. As such, bearing a tattoo could be an indicator of affiliation with the Yakuza, especially if they are done in the specific Yakuza style. (Japan Daily Press, 2012)
Another difference is the ‘legal’ aspect of the Yakuza. Much like other criminal organizations it is undoubtedly true that there are large amounts of money and power involved in the day-to-day business of the organization, but unlike the other criminal organizations this power is very visible and manifests very clearly in everyday life for Japan. This holds especially true for the corporate and political world of Japan. (Fisher, 2012) One might think that the very essence of being a criminal organization ensures that nobody – corporate or politically affiliated – would cooperate with them, but the opposite has held true in many cases. In fact, contrary to popular belief, the government actually acknowledges them and regulates (some) them. In turn this legalizes the Yakuza, and in fact, being a part of a Yakuza group is not always illegal in Japan.
This has happened in return for the financial and physical favours they have done for the political elite. Although one could describe this as corruption, the shape it takes resembles something more closely related to the acknowledgement of the good within the bad. The reason for my saying this is that there have been a lot of crackdowns on the criminal elements of the Yakuza both from the police and their leadership as well as the political elite despite the fact that they have received favours in the past. (Fisher, 2012) Until 1992 however, the Yakuza enjoyed a more or less free playing field for them to muddle around in, and it wasn’t until 1992 that the political elite begun fighting back. And even then, it is hard to say that the political elite has actually reached any goals. In fact, the crackdowns that have thus far occurred forced the Yakuza to reorganize into more efficient leadership methods as well as financial schemes, which in turn has made them more profitable. (Kaplan, 2012)
Policy implications of the Yakuza influence
Thus far, the Yakuza has had a lot of influence in the political world of Japan. It seems that the current outlook is that this is unlikely to change soon, due to heavily ingrained influence, large amounts of legal assets (financial, influence on people, capability to muster support for a cause) as well as the ability to utilize assets/influence for the public good (for example the 2012 disaster relief). These factors all have caused the Yakuza to become heavily involved not only in the countries politics but also their economy.
Due to their political involvement with the ‘Liberal Democratic Party’ of Japan, many Yakuza clans are directly involved with numerous political characters, and have been involved with the allocation of official government titles to people from this party. (Independent, 1993) This influence is to be blamed for most of the lenient policies that the Yakuza have faced in the past. For example, it is not illegal to be part of a Yakuza clan in Japan, and for a long time it was also legal to do business with Yakuza clans, despite their criminal nature. This has changed now, but for the longest time the Yakuza had more or less obtained a free reign when it came to their power.
Through their massive influence over the Japanese political situation, they have been able to ensure that, for instance, they would not get wiretapped and would not be interfered with in their money-making schemes. (Fisher, 2012)
Another implication thus far has been the acceptance of the National Police Agency (NPA) that they would be unable to get rid of criminal elements and activities within society altogether. This context is perhaps best comparable to the Dutch acknowledgement of drugs as an illegal substance and the Dutch governmental choice on how to deal with users – the acceptance of the inability to deal with users, and instead opting for a campaign of regulation and education on the effects of drugs. For the Yakuza, this approach has meant that thus far the police have maintained a policy of acceptance. For example, the gambling and prostitution industry have thus far historically been the area of operations for the Yakuza. Both gambling and prostitution are illegal in Japan, but it seems unlikely that the Japanese police would be able to deal with the problem. Therefore, they have opted to let the Yakuza conduct their operations ‘’out of sight’’ to ensure that the gambling and prostitution dens would at least be controlled by a figure of authority who they could count on to keep the peace. (Independent, 1993)
To add onto this, Japan has always had a very heavy anti-drug stance and will most likely continue to hold on to these values. Never the less, the NPA or perhaps more obviously, the police officers of Japan, have always more or less accepted the drug trade the Yakuza were involved in. This came from the mutual understanding that while the drugs the Yakuza dealt in (soft drugs) were harmful, harder drug types would be even more harmful, both to the people that took them and the general public, and the Yakuza would therefore ensure these were kept off the streets – and hopefully out of Japan altogether. From this is visible that, once again, while the Yakuza engage in criminal activities, they consider themselves to be an ‘honourable organization’ and they try to uphold themselves to that standard.
As the Yakuza are notoriously right wing, it is also probable that they have helped in shaping laws and regulations of the country. Although Japan is seen as a liberal left wing country in modern times (depending on what part of their policy/law-making you are looking at), this wasn’t always the case. Following the Yakuza and their influence on the Liberal Democratic Party, Japan underwent heavy right wing decision-making that shaped the laws of Japan, and as it is not improbable to estimate that current immigration policies as well as other policies are a result of this influence.
Policy implementations to combat the Yakuza
Due to the pre-existing power of the Yakuza groups, both economically as they have managed to white-wash their money through legal enterprises being constructed, as well as politically through the earning of favours from high-ranking government officials, it will be very hard to properly ‘combat’ the Yakuza. And in addition to their established power, the police also acknowledge that if they were to fully get rid of the Yakuza, these groups would be replaced with less organized and ‘chivalrous’ groups which would lead to even more apparent criminality and problem. (Fisher, 2012, Kaplan, 2012)
Although there are some critics of the approach, reintegrative shaming plays a large part in dealing with criminality in Japan – in fact, in some studies it is attributed as the number 1 approach for Japanese approaches to crime. This is especially interesting, considering that Japan has one of the lowest crime rates in the world. (Kersten, 1993)
But for the Yakuza this lays differently. They are easily spotted, as compared to ‘regular’ criminals. Due to Japan’s attitude to, for instance, tatttoo’s, it would be very hard to reintegrate these people. After all, whe you get banned from spa’s due to having tattoo’s, how could one expect to get a legal job when you have tattoo’s? (Japan Daily Press, 2012) Furthermore, we should also consider that there is a ‘price’ to be paid for leaving a Yakuza group. If someone wishes to leave the group and cease associating with them, the Yakuza will most likely demand a price to be paid in the form of a finger being lost, or depending on the offenses, death. So when we approach the Yakuza problem with the approach of reintegrating them, it seems that this will be close to impossible.
Another problem with the reintegrative shaming approach is that in Japanese culture, the Yakuza are seen as ‘a fact of life’ (Fisher, 2012) and it is believed that they serve a purpose in Japanese society. This represents something akin to ‘providing balance in the evil’ or ‘organized criminality’ that prevents criminals from growing too chaotic, evil and twisted. Although it would be hard to prove this is the case, the culture seems to imply that it is. As a result, reintegrative shaming will most likely not have a large effect, since the Yakuza believe that their position is one of necessary evil.
Another potential problem with policy implementations to combat the Yakuza is the fact that Yakuza are theoretically not an illegal organization in and of itself. Although the police would argue otherwise, it is not precisely clear whether or not Yakuza activities are attributed to the Yakuza group itself or the individuals conducting them (in name of the group). Therefore, is it possible that the reintegrative shaming method that is proclaimed to be ‘highly effective’ due to low crime rates really as effective, if the lack of documentation of illegal activities conducted by the Yakuza groups means that the low crime-rate is artificial? After all, if we documented the activities conducted by the groups properly, wouldn’t the crime-rate rise higher?
So if the primary solution applied to criminals proves to be ineffective to the Yakuza, what would work? The answer is complex and is almost certainly the case that there is no universal answer. After all, the Yakuza groups are very different and all of them seem to have their own organizational personality. (Kaplan, 2012) Where as some organizations are ultra-violent and involved in violent crimes, other Yakuza organizations have since the re-organizations shifted their activities almost entirely to the legal side of the spectrum, only engaging in ‘grey area’ crimes from time to time. So almost naturally, the approach to this type of powerful economical Yakuza group would differ strongly from the ultra-violent Yakuza groups.
And even if there were actions to be taken, would this be the right move? Although combatting their highly illegal and harmful activities (violence, drug trade, human trafficking) is most certainly a requirement, nationally by the National Police Association, and internationally by the international community at large, it would be naïve to assume that there are no benefits to the Japanese government as well as the Japanese society as a whole that come from these Yakuza organizations. Who else will provide a measure of organization and order in otherwise chaotic businesses like prostitution and drug trade? Would these issues not grow even larger with the absence of Yakuza groups? The NPA seems to think so, and history agrees as well.
As evidence has shown us, the Yakuza largely legalized their operations during the period after world war 2 – when Japan was going through a large scale industrialization and economics were looking up. Perhaps one solution would be to ensure economic viability in Japan – lately their economy has stagnated and while they are not going through a recession in the same capacity as the western world, their economy isn’t growing at a large rate either. In order to facilitate the legalization of their activities, one idea would be to ensure a prosperous economy. This is naturally within the interest of the entire country, however, and therefore it would be hard to sell this as an ‘anti-Yakuza policy.’
Measures that can be taken to combat Yakuza activity in general is, first of all, to actually make Yakuza organizations illegal. As of yet, most Yakuza members are not considered to be criminals purely by association (although, it is in fact illegal to deal with and facilitate illegal operations conducted by Yakuza groups) and in fact, they openly use the name of their respective Yakuza group to gain (negative) respect in the form of fear. (Fisher, 2012) If Japan were to make Yakuza groups as a whole into an illegal organization, these organizations will be forced to change their modus operandi, and will be forced to either adapt a new identity (through which the Japanese government/police could force them to conduct legal operations) or otherwise force them to adopt a construction similar to the Italian mafia. This would mean that they would no longer be able to use their identity as a Yakuza group to force people to do their will – and thus would harm their business initially while they adapt. During this period it would be possible to arrest and trial these members.
There is a glaring problem with this policy, and any other policy that could be created. The Yakuza’s large influence on the politics of the country and their financial capabilities (that open up a world of lobbying that is unpresedented in other criminal organizations) mean that they are more than likely completely capable of blocking any type of policy that would severely harm their livelihood.
But perhaps the most interesting policy solution would be to cooperate with the Yakuza groups – although they clearly engage in illegal operations, it is also not the case that they never perform worthwhile deeds. Although they are a criminal organization in essence, it might be worthwhile to cooperate with them and enforce positive deeds while limiting negative deeds. For instance, a possible method of cooperation (not unlike western methods) would be the legalization of prostitution and soft drugs. The chances of this ever happening are slim due to Japanese culture, but if we disregard that, this has the promise of a worthwhile policy implementation.
One prerequisite of this policy however would be the inclusion of influential Yakuza groups in the discussion to shape this policy. After all, it would not create a positive environment if the Japanese government would disregard the already existing drug and prostitution systems, and would disregard the parties involved in these systems. Simply a legalization of the existing systems with regulations and official bodies would most likely help combat the illegal activities of the groups while also enforcing positive regulations and laws to ensure that working conditions are better than they were before, and above all, that they are safer. This would help ensure safety for all parties involved, limit criminality (because the acts are no longer criminal, as well as being able to regulate those that work outside of the legal system better and deal with them) and appease the Yakuza groups in a way that doesn’t force them to use their power negatively.
All-in-all however, it appears as if there is no solvable solution to the Yakuza-problem. Their power has been allowed to grow too strong and any policy implementation that is direct will likely be countered more or less directly by their influence and economical power to lobby. Perhaps the best solution is to simply accept their presence as the Japanese government has done so far, and only interfere when the public safety or lives of civilians are endangered or at stake. So far this has seemed to work somewhat, although it is a problem that this policy would allow the Yakuza’s power to grow even larger.
Bibliography
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Independent. (1993, January 17). Japan's Crime Incorporated: The years of the bubble economy lured Japan's yakuza gangs to muscle into big business. Terry McCarthy in Tokyo explores their corporate web. Retrieved from Independent: independent.co.uk/news/business/japans..
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Kersten, J. (1993). Street Youths, Bosozoku, and Yakuza: Subculture Formation and Societal Reactions in Japan . SAGE Social Science Collections.
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